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QUALITY ADJUSTED COST FUNCTIONS
ABSTRACT
We propose a simple method for estimating cost functions in
the presence of endogenous and unobserved quality. The theory of
production, the equilibrium conditions implied by optimizing
behavior, and exogenous influences on product demand are used to
identify the model. An important advantage of the method is that
the data requirements, above those necessary for standard cost
function estimation, are minimal and the data are usually readily
available. Specifically, exogenous information that influences
the demand for the firm's product is required.
We apply this method to estimate quality—adjusted cost
functions in the nursing home industry. Estimation of a translog
cost function that ignores quality yields seriously misleading
estimates of marginal cost and economies of scale. In particular,
while estimation of a quality—exogenous cost functionreports
economies of scale, estimation of a quality adjusted cost function
reveals djseconomjes of scale for high quality homes, constant
returns to scale for average quality homes, and economies of scale
for low quality homes.
Paul J. Gertler Donald M. Waidman
The Rand Corporation Department of Economics
1700 Main Street University of Colorado
P.O. Box 2138 Campus Box 256
Santa Monica, CA 90406 Boulder, Co 80309—02561. INTRODUCTION
Thestructure of production is a cornerstone of economic research and crucial to the
implementation of regulatory policy. Indeed, economists regularly estimate cost functions to
learn about marginal cost, elasticities of substitution, and economies of scale which are then
used to make inferences about firm behavior nd economic efficiency. The vast majority of
these studies, however, have treated product quality as an unobserved factor that is assumed
to be either constant or uncorrelated with included variables.1 If this assumption is correct,
standard analyses produce consistent estimates of important parameters.In many cases.
however, this assumption is almost surely incorrect, implying that conventional cost function
estimates do not provide accurate representations of the structure of production. In this
paper, we propose a novel method for estimating cost functions in the presence of unobserved
and endogenous quality, and use that method to estimate quality-adjusted cost functions for
nursing homes.
The fact that economists routinely ignore the possibility of endogenous quality in cost
function estimation is surprising. The notion that firms product.differentiate and engage in
non-price competition has been an active area of research since Chamberlain (1933).
Empirically, implicit markets for endogenous product quality characteristics have been studied
extensively in the hedonic pricing literature since Rosen (1974).Moreover, a significant
amount of attention has been paid to the performance and welfare implications of endogenous
quality responses to regulatory policy.2 Indeed, in the presence of price regulation, one should
expect even greater endogenous variation in product quality, since quality characteristics are
the only strategic variables that these firms can use to pursue profit maximization. In
particular, endogenous quality responses to price regulation in the nursing home industry have
been explored in Dueansky (1989), Nyman (1985), and Gertter (1989).
Braeutigsm and Pauly (1980) is one of the few articles that explores the implications of
endogecious product quality in the estimation of cost functions. They argue that one should
consider endogenous quality to be the standard case in cost function estimation,
few cost function studies have included observed or hedonic quality measures in
estimation as exogenous variables. These include Friecilander and Spady (1980), Braeutigam,
Daughety and Trunquist (1982, 1984), Fuss and Waverman (1981), and Christensen,
Cummings and Scho.ech (1980). Friedlander and Spady (1980) raise the issue of the
endogeneity of quality. They note, therefore, that their parameter estimates represent a
behavioral" rather than structural cost function.
2
Examples of studies that focus on endogenous quality responses to price regulation
include Posner (1971), Stigler (1971). White (1972), Rose and Panzar (1974), Douglas and
Miller (1974), Psuzar (1975), Spence (1975), Schmalensee (1977), .Joskow and Noll (1981),
Nyman (1985), Gertler (1989), Allen and Gertler (1990).especially in regulated industries. Further, they demonstrate that, as a result of the firm's
optimization process, product quality must be correlated with included right-hand side
variables in any empirical cost function specification. Failure to account for quality will result
in biased cost function estimates and, therefore, invalid characterizations of the firm's
structure of production. They provide a very simple and useful specification test to determine
if cost function estimates suffer from bias due to endogenous and unobserved quality. The
value of their test is that it does not require one to directly observe quality characteristics.
Braeutigam and Pauly use this test to demonstrate that cost functions in the regulated
automobile insurance industry suffer from such bias.
If quality is so important, why is it often ignored in cost function estimation? Perhaps
the major reason is data problems. Quality is usually defined in terms of the characteristics of
goods other than the physical units in which the good is priced (Lancaster, 1976; Leffler,
1982).In many industries, and especially in service sectors, the number of quality
characteristics can be quite large and difficult to measure. Typically, the data requirements for
such endeavors are onerous and data collection itself can be quite costly.
The quality.adjusted cost function proposed below treats quality as endogenous and
unobserved, and does not require large amounts of additional data. The theory of production,
the equilibrium conditions implied by optimizing behavior, and exogenous influences on
product demand identify the model. An important advantage of the quality-adjusted cost
function is that the data requirements, above those necessary for standard cost function
estimation, are minimal and the data are usually readily available. Specifically, exogenous
information that influences the demand for the firm's product is required. Thus, as in hedonic
pricing models, cross-market variation in the exogenous determinants of product demand is
needed for identification (see Brown and Rosen, 1982). The same type of information is
employed by Deaton (1988), who use. demographic difference. across geographic locations to
correct prices for quality differences.
This method is used to estimate quality-adjusted cost functions in the nursing home
industry. We find that the estimation of a quality-exogenous ti-analog colt function yields
seriously misleading estimates of marginal cost and economies of scale. When quality is
ignored, the estimates are consistent with recent nursing home cost function studies (Dor,
1989; McKay, 1988; Nyman, 1989) in suggesting large economies of scale. However, estimates
of a quality-adjusted colt function show diseconomies of scale for high quality homes, constant
returns to scale for average quality homes, and eionomiea of scale for low quality homes.-3-
2.THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL
Thissection describes the behavioral model assumed to produce the observed data on
firm output and costs, and the unobserved (to the econometrician) differences in product
quality.Consider a firm selling a multidimensional product. The product is sold in units
measured by one of the product's attributes. This attribute defines the quantity units in
which the product is sold and the other attributes characterize the product's quality. For
example, two attributes of milk are volume and percent butterfat. Milk is sold in quarts,
implying that volume is quantity and percent butterfat is quality. For the distinction to have
nontrivial implications for cost function estimation, the firm must spend resources to produce
higher quality, and consumers must be willing to pay more for a higher quality product.
The firm's demand function is defined in terms of itS price, quantity, and quality.
Changes in quality attributes shift the demand curve. This notion of quality is consistent with
all market structures where there is product differentiation, including monopoly, oligopoly,
monopolistic competition, and the competitive specifications of the hedonic pricing literature.
As in the hedonic literature, consumers are assumed to have a range of tastes for quality,
implying that firms producing products with differing quality levels can coexist in the same
market. In addition to price and quality, the quantity demanded from the firm is influenced
by cross-market differences in characteristics of consumers (for example, population size,
income, and education) and the degree of competition.
Suppose that the product has only two attributes (quantity and quality) or that all of
the quality attributes can be aggregated into a single index of quality. Let Q be the quality
level per unit output. Then, the firms demand function is given by:
= Y(Q, P,Z) , (1)
where P is product price (per unit quantity), and Z is a vector of variables exogenous to the
firm that shift the demand curve. Demand is assumed to be falling in price and risir in
quality, while the effect of changes in Z depend upon the definitions of these variables.3
3This demand function applies to monopolistic and monopolistically competitive
market structures.In oligopolistic markets, demand will also depend upon the price and
quality of other firms in the market. The application of our methods to those markets does
not present new problems, as indicated below.4-
Given a transformation (production) function and input prices, the cost function is
derived by choosing inputs to minimize the costs of producing quantity Y at quality Q. Let V
be a vector of exogenous factor input prices. The cost function is:
C=C(YQ,W) , (2)
wherecost is assumedtobe increasinginallitsarguments.
Thefirmchoosesprice and qualitytomaximizeprofits, II:
11 =PY(Q,P,Z)-C[Y(Q,P,Z),Q,W] , (3)
The levelsofPand Q that maximize(3)are assumed to satisfy the first order conditions:
oil o — = 0-. P + Y—
— 0 P —OC''+ OC (5) 8Q
-..
The price condition (4) equates marginal revenue from a price change to marginal cost, while
the quality condition (5) equates the marginal revenue from increasing quality to the marginal
cost of quality. Equations 1, 2, 4, and 5 can be solved for the endogenous variables P and Q
in terms of the exogenous variables W and Z:
P = P(W,Z), (6)
Q= Q(W,Z). (7)
Equations1, 2, 6, and 7 determine an equilibrium output, price, quality, and generate observed
costs given by equation 2. The parameters of thecostfunction are the objects of estimation..5-
3.EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Inthis section, the behavioral model is used to derive the empirical specification and
discuss identification. With observed quality, the empirical model consists of the structural
demand and cost functions (1 and 2), and the equilibrium price and quality equations, (6 arid
7). The behavioral theory implies a set of identifying restrictions on the parameters of these
equations. Namely, the Z are excluded from the cost function (2). Variation in Z shifts the
product demand function and the equilibrium price and quality equations. Therefore, (2) is
identified and may be estimated once functional form assumptions are made.
The difficulty in identifying the parameters of the cost function arises not only because
both quantity and quality are endogenous, but also because quality is unobserved. We show
that the cost function is identified in a system that includes the cost function (2), the
equilibrium quality equation (7), and an expression for quantity in terms of quality and other
exogenous variables. Identification will be achieved through a set of parametric restrictions
implied by the first order conditions, information that affects product demand but not costs,
and nonlinearities in the cost function.
We begin by deriving the empirical specification. To obtain an expression for Y
conditional on Q, substitute (6) into (1) to give4
Y = f(Q,W,Z) (8)
Since Q is unobserved, it is necessary to substitute (7) into (2) and (8) to produce the
empirical model
C = C[Q( W,Z ),Y,W], (9)
Y =Y[Q(W,Z),W,Z)
(10)
4Thisconditional demand function (8)isconsistent with all market structures (see
previous footnote).In oligopolistic markets, prices and qualities of other firms enter the
demand function. The equilibrium values of these prices and qualities will be functions of the
XV's and Z's faced by these firms. Since firms in the same market face the same W's and Vs.
the prices and qualities of the other firms have already been implicitly substituted for in the
conditional demand function.Since the Q(•) function appearsinboth (9) and(10).the parameters on the determinants of
quality can only differ across (9) and (10) by a factor of proportionality. This factor is the
ratio of the marginal Cost of quality to the marginal change in demand with respect to quality.
These proportionality restrictions apply regardless of the functional form of the Cost and
product demand functions.
The proportionality restrictions and the availability of variables exogenous to the firm
that shift the product demand function are necessary to identify the model. The first order
conditions imply that the optimal level of quality depends upon both exogenous supply and
demand factors, whereas the cost function depends only on input prices and quality. Thus.
conditional on quantity and input prices, the variation in coSts across firms that is correlated
with exogenous determinants of product demand reflects quality variation. That is, it reflects
firms' quality (resource) responses to different demand structures. 5 .6
Although the identifying information 2 also enters the right hand side of (9) via the
Q(.) function, its coefficients are restricted by the cross-equation proportionality constraints.
These restrictions are the same as those that characterize the umultiple indicator multiple
cause" (MIMIC) latent variable model (see Joreskog and Goldberger, 1975). In this MIMIC
specification the indicators of the latent variable quality are (1) costs filtered for variation due
to quantity and input prices and (2) demand filtered for variation due to exogenous
determinants. The remaining variation in filtered Costs and demand are functions solely of
quality and random disturbances. Thus, the indicators of quality, filtered costs and demand.
have the same covariation with the causes (determinants) of quality but are measured in
different units, The causes of the latent variable quality axe exogenous supply and demand
factors.
An additional problem arises ih the latent variable framework when causes of the latent
variable also directly affect the observable outcomes. This is the case in our model because the
latent variableis determined by a reduced form equation which necessarily contains all exog-
enous variable,.Therefore, input prices are common to the cost function (2) and the
This is basically the same idea put forth in Bra.eutigarn and Pauly (1986) to develop
their test for the endogencity of unobserved quality in cost function estimation, They noted
that if quality is endogenous and omitted from the cost function, then, by substituting the
reduced-form quality function into the cost function, price and exogenous determinants of
demand will affect costs.
ariation, in cost or input demands after controlling for quantity and input prices are
generally attributed to technical inefficiency. However, while this source of variation may be
related to input usage, it should not be reiatei in any way to demand variables.equilibrium quality function (7). The result of this is that there will be fewer reduced form
estimates than structural parameters, a violation of the order condition for identification. This
can be seen by specifying linear Cost, demand, and equilibrium quality equations and solving
for the reduced form. The conditions for identification can be satisfied in these cases by the
introduction of nonhinearities into the cost function.Nonhinearities, such as the square of
output or the interaction of quantity and quality, are natural in the cost function, where, in
fact, a linear specification would be unusual.7 These nonhinearities add higher order moments
of Z and interactions of Z and V to the reduced form which provide the additional information
necessary for identification.8 The model is identified for all of the flexible functional forms
since they include higher order moments.
Overidentifying information is available from the input demands. By Shephard's
Lemma the demand for input i is
XI = XI [Q(Z ), Y, WI, i = 1 n, (11)
where n is the number of inputs. Since the Q() function appears in equations (11) as well as
in (9) and (10), the parameters on the determinants of quality can only differ across these
equations by a factor of proportionality. The parameters of the share equations are a subset
of the parameters of the cost function.Since the input demand functions add no new
structural parameters, the addition of (11) adds overidentifying information and efficiency in
estimation.
As irs all latent variable models, the model is identified only up to an arbitrary factor of
proportionality (Aigner et al, 1984). This is because the latent variable quality has no units of
measurement. Without lou of generality, an arbitrary normalization defines a metric for
quality and completes identification of the model. The estimates of the structure of production
are invariant to the normalization.
This identification problem and solution is very similar to the identification issue in
hedonic models as first noted by Brown and Rosen (1982).
8The model specified above is identified for a wide class of technologies, including all of
the flexible functional forms. Excluded from this list, however, are linear cost functions.
Linear cost functions are, of course, very restrictive technologies, where the marginal costs of
quantity and quality are constant, independent of one another, and independent of the input
prices.This imposes constant returns to scale and constant marginal costs. Linear cost
functions also rule out, a priori, the likely property that the marginal cost of producing
another physical unit of output, though constant, is different for firms producing products of
different quality levels.-8-
4.ECONOMETRIC METHODS
Theestimation of a quality-adjusted cost function requires specification of functional
formsfor thecost, conditional demand, and equilibrium quality equations as well as stochastic
assumptions.We estimate a quality-adjustedtranslogcost function. The firm isassumedto
observeaseries ofshocks(E)thatinfluenceits decision making (and hence its costs), but
theseshocksareunobserved to the investigator (McElroy 1986). Treating quantity and
qualityas the two attributes of output, the translog cost function with n inputs is:
logC =a + cstog Y + cslog Q + E n,,, log W ÷ (log Y)2
+ logY log Q+dqq(logQ)2+E logW log W
+ log Y log W +i3, log Q log W +clog W, + r(12)
i=1 I = 1 in
whereC is cost, Y is output,Q is quality,theare inputprices,andriswhitenoise. The
corresponding share equationsare:
S =a,,,+ E3log W, + .l3,log Y + flq,log Q+,,i= 1n.(13)
As a result of the McElroyerrorstructure, the share equation disturbances are additive and
logically consistent with the cost function error specification. The variance-covariance matrix
of the cost function and the share errors is unrestricted. However, errors are assumed to be
uncorrelated across firms.
The parameters of the cost and share equations are constrained by the usual symmetry
restrictions (=i). and homogeneity of degree one in input pricesimplies:
Ea,=0; =0;E$,=°; and
1=1 1=1 )=l 1=1
Theseconstraints do not place restrictions on measures of scale economies or input price
elasticities..9-
Wealso specify a logarithmic conditional product demand function:
£
log Y = + - log Q + E y, log +-y., log Z + i.' (14)
where Z (i = .,., K) are exogenous factors that shift the demand function and u is a random
disturbance.
To complete the functional form assumptions, we specify a logarithmic equilibrium
quality equation:
K
log Q = A log Z +A, log W + , (15)
1=1
where e is a random disturbance. As in most latent variable models (see Aigner et al., 1984:
Joreskog and Goldberger, 1975) the intercept is not identified.
While the first-order term of the unobservable, log Q, adds information to the reduced-
form cost, share and product demand functions, the second-order term (log Q)2 does not.
That is, its inclusion in the cost function does not add to the number of reduced-form
exogenous variables in any of the equations. Its presence merelyduplicatesall terms quadratic
in log W and log Z and an terms in log W.log Z, due to the presence of log Y•log W, (log Y ),
and log Ylog Q in the cost function. The addition of this term does, however, add a
substantial number of nonlinear constraints on the parameter space, which serve mostly to
complicate optimization in an already overidentified model.This greatly increases the
computational burden of estimation.It is not clear that the additional flexibility of the cost
function due to the presence of a term in (log Q ) is worth the cost imposed upon estimation.
While it is possible to identify its coefficient, /3qq, our intuition is that we are asking a lot of
the data to distinguish both first and second order terms in unobservable.. Therefore, we
simplify the model by setting I3qq equal to zero.
Since quality is unobserved, it must be eliminated from the cost, share and product
demand equations by substitution, producing:10 -
log C = cx0+o log Y +(ow, + log W,
+ (log Y)2+ +q-\,) logY log W,
+ E(.3,, + 2.3q,j) log W log W + A, log Z =Lj=1
K ' K
+ , log Z, log Y + log Z log W, + ( (16) s1 ,=Ij=1
St= + + 3,)Log W, + I3log Y
+ 0qE,log Z + (,t = 1 n, (17)
K log Y =+ (, + 1A) log W, + + (, + yq,) log Z, + ( (18)
,=1
where (. and (, are functions of , v,ande, and the parameters, and are heteroskedastic.
The model is estimated with a minimum distance estimator (see Chamberlain, 1982).
This estimator is especially well-suited for a system of equations with nonhnear, cross-equation
restrictions and general (unknown)formsof heteroskeda.sticity. Chamberlain shows that the
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal.Further, he proves that it isefficientfor
this type of model. Implementation of the estimator involves minimizing a function of the
distance between the vectors of the structural parameters and reduced form coefficients. Thus.
expressions are needed for the reduced form coefficients in terms of the structural parameters.
The reduced form cost and share functions are obtained by substituting equation 18 intO
equations 16 and 17. These equations along with the reduced form product demand equation
(18) produce a vector of reduced-form coefficients on all first- and second. order moments of
the exogenous variables in the vectors log W and log Z, and a constant. In obvious flotation
these moments and the solution for the reduced-form coefficients in terms of the structural
parameters are displayed in Table 1. In Appendix A we provide the distance function that is
minimized and the properties of the resulting estimator.- ii V
3. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE: THE CASE OF NURSING HOMES
To demonstrate the importanceof the endogenousquality, we estimate a quality-
adjusted cost function for nursing homes, The nursing home industry is one in which
endogenous quality is of real concern and knowledge of the structure of production is of policy
Lnterest. indeed, recent studies have focused on nursing homes quality responses to changes in
price regulation and competition (Dusansky, 1989; Gertler, 1989; Nyman 1985). Since the
government pays for approximately 50% of all nursing home care through the Medicaid
program, understanding the structure of nursing home productionis crucial for setting
Medicaid reimbursement rates.
The specification is a three-input, quality-adjusted cost function: where the inputs are
skilled labor, unskilled labor, and supplies.9 Quantity is measured in annual patient days
(divided by 365). The exogenous demand information includes the population over age 65 in
the market, per capita income in the market, the Herfindahi index of market concentration
(competitiveness), the Medicaid reimbursement rate, and a "casemix" index of health status.
The data come from a 1980 survey of New York State nursing homes (New York State, 1980).
The sample includes 279 proprietary nursing homes. Descriptive statistics for these variables
are provided in Table 2. The selection of the sample and the construction of the variables are
described in Appendix B.
Total output, Y, is exogenous in the nursing home industry (see Scanlon, 1980; Vogel
and Palmer, 1983; Nyman, 1985: Dusansky, 1989; Gertler, 1989). Government regulation
imposes a capacity constraint on nursing homes that is binding. Nursing homes can fill their
capacity with two types of patients: those who finance their care privately (private pay
patients) and those whose care is financed through a government entitlement program
(primarily Medicaid). Homes can charge private-pay patients what the market will bear and
receive the Medicaid reimbursement rate for Medicaid patients. However, homes cannot legally
discriminate by method of payment in their provision of services, so that the same quality is
supplied to both private-pay and Medicaid patients. Whereas private-pay demand depends on
both price and quality, Medicaid demand is perfectly elastic at the Medicaid reimbursement
In this application we have ignored capital stock, which is usually treated as a quasi.
fixed factor. A nursing home's capital stock mainly consists of the building and there are very
limited substitution possibilities between labor and capital. We experimented with using the
building's area in square feet per bed as a measure of a nursing home's capital stock. None of
the additional coefficients were statistically significant at conventional levels nor were there
any substantive changes in existing coefficient estimates.12 -
rate. Homes use price and quality to compete for private.pay patients knowing that they can
always fill excess capacity with Medicaid patients at the Medicaid reimbursement rate. Thus.
price and quality choices determine the mix of private and Medicaid patients, while the total
number of patients is determined exogenously by regulation. In this case, the cost function
can be identified without the conditional demand equation. Therefore, equation (18) is not
estimated — the empirical model reduces to equations (16) and (17).
Estimates are presented for both quality-adjusted and quality-exogenous cost functions.
The quality-exogenous modeL treats quality as an unobserved factor that is uncorrelated with
the right-hand side variables in the cost and share equations, and therefore is subsumed in the
error terms. The parameter 13qj has been normalized to one in the quality-adjusted cost
function, The coefficients and asymptotic t-statistics for the quality-adjusted cost function
and equilibrium quality equation are presented in the first and third columns of Table 3. and
the estimates of the quality-exogenous cost function are presented in the second column.
The quality-adjusted estimation results agree nicely with economic theory and are
generally precisely estimated as indicated by the t-statistics. The economic interpretation of
the results is discussed in detail below. Braeutigam and Pauly (1986) show that there is
unobserved and endogenous quality bias if one can reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of the demand variables in the cost function are zero. This null hypothesis is
overwhelmingly rejected, leading us to prefer the quality-adjusted estimates.
The estimated equilibrium quality equation (Table 3, third column) ha.s great intuitive
appeal. The first two coefficients, both negative and significantly different from zero, measure
the effect of input prices on quality.Increases in input price, raise the marginal cost of
quality. Therefore, the results are consistent with the notion that as the marginal cost of
quality rises, firms reduce quality. The next six coefficients represent demand-side variables.
The coefficients on population, income and their interaction are jointly significant. They
indicate that homes in markets where the aged population is larger and incomes are higher
supply greater quality. The negative sign of the interaction indicates that while the total
effect of increasing income on quality is positive, the size of the effect is smaller in markets
with larger elderly populations. Similarly, while the total effect of population is positive, the
size of the effect is smaller in markets with greater per capita. income. The coefficient on case-
mix indicates that homes supply sicker patients with more quality. The results also show that
quality is lower in more concentrated markets, indicating that more competition results iii
higher quality. Finally, the coefficient on the Medicaid reimbursement rate is negative and13 -
significantly different fromzero.Thisresultis consistent with the theoretical and empirical
literature on nursing home behavior (Nyman 1985; Dusansky 1989; Gertler 1989).
There are substantive differences between the parameter estimates for the quality-
exogenous and the quality-adjusted cost functions. First, the quality-adjusted model has five
additional parameters corresponding to quality.One of thoseis the parameter which has
been normalized to one. Theestimates ofthree of the remainingfourparameters are
significantly different from zero.In addition, inspection of the first two columns of Table 3
reveals that there are important differences in sign and magnitude between coefficient
estimates on variables common to both models.
As for all flexible functional forms, the interpretation of the coefficients is difficult. A
more meaningful comparison of the bias from ignoring quality is in terms of estimates of the
structure of production: economies of scale and average and marginal cost curves.
Consider economies of scale, which are measured by 1-OlnC/älny (Christensen and
Greene, 1976). In the quality-exogenous case, scale economies are estimated to be 0.061 at the
mean of the data. This implies that a doubling of patients will reduce average cost by
approximately 6%. These results are very similar to those found by Dor (1989) using national
data, McKay (1988) using Texas data, and Nyman (1989) using 1983 New York data.
Economies of scale measures in the quality-adjusted model tell quite a different story.
Since economies of scale depend upon the level of quality, measures were calculated for homes
that supply different quality. Low, average, and high quality were obtained by predicting
quality for each of the homes using the estimated reduced-form quality equation, The
minimum, mean, and maximum of these predictions were used a.. the measures of low,
average, and high quality. While we find economies of scale for low-quality homes, the cost
function exhibit,constantreturns to scale at average quality and diseconomie. of scale at high
quality. Specically, scale economies for the average size home are .065 for low quality, -.001
for average quality, and -.044 for high quality. The presence of diseconomies of scale in high
quality homes is consistent with the conventional wisdom for nursing home.. Higher quality is
produced through labor intensive activities such as personal contact with patients by
employees, and highly personalized physical and psychological therapy. These activities become
moredifficultto manage as the home betomes large.
Tofurther illustratethe differences, Figure1is a graph of the average cost per patient
day forboththe quality-adjusted and qualit-exogenous models. The quality-exogenous- 14-
averagecost curve isdownward sloping indicating economies of scale. Threequality-adjusted
averagecost functions are drawn one for a low quality home, a second for an average quality
home, and third for a high quality home. The average cost curve for thelowquality borneis
downward sloping, indicating economies of scale.For average quality, the curve is flat.
indicating constant returns to scale, while for high quality the curve is rising, indicating
diseconomies of scale. Note that as quality rises, the slope of the average Cost curve increases.
This fanning of the average cost curves in the quality-adjusted case is missed when quality is
taken to be exogenous.
In the empirical application, the results demonstrate that a quality.exogenous translog
cost function yields seriously misleading estimates of the structure of production. There are
three pieces of evidence that support this conclusion.First, consistent with the quality
endogenous theoretical model, exogenous demand influences were found to be significant
determinants of cost, after controlling for quantity and input prices. Second, the parameter
estimates of the quality-endogenous model differed substantiveLy from those of the quality-
exogenous model. Finally, while the quality-exogenous model reported economies of scale, the
quality-endogenous model revealed that economies of scale differ by quality level.• 15
Appendix A
This Appendix shows how the minimum distance estimator is applied to the model.
The presentation follows Chamberlain (1982) closeLy; reference is made to thatpaper for
proofs. The discussion of the minimum distance estimator is facilitated by simplifying the
notation.Define= (log C,, S1, S,,, log Y), and let X. be the vector of the
explanatory variables (the first column of Table I), where i indexes observations. Define II' =
(,r' Tn+2') and= ( p••' '+2).whereis the vector of parameters in
reduced form equation t, for= I n+2. The system of reduced form equations can be
written
= 'x + 'i,' (19)
wbere= (q, and 'ii, is the error term in the' reduced-formequation for
individual i. Arrange the structural parameters in a vector 9. Then the constraints expressed
in Table 1 can be represented by the functions LIf (9).
The minimum distance estimator chooses 9 to minimize the length of LI — f (9) in the
metric of V(t7),thecovariance matrix of the vector of reduced-form errors. In order to derive
the exact distance function to be minimized, let II be the Lea.at squares estimator of II, and let
be analogousLy defined. Then
— El).N(O,))
whereti=E[V(i, IX) XX.' ) +), V(v,jX,)is theconditionalvariance of q given
X, • = E(X,X'), and there are T observations. A consistent estimator of ti is








The minimum distance estimator 9 is consistent with limiting distribution
4T(è—9)'. N(O.F'tTF)
Of(9) where F =
Inaddition, the criterion function for the minimum distance estimator serves as a test
of the model restrictions.Given the number of structural and reduced form parameters
discussed above, under the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid we have
a 2 g(9) —.x
wherej=n2+nK+K(K-f-1)/2-2n-317 -
Appendix B
The data are constructed from New York State's 1980 survey of Long Term Care
Facilities. The sample consists of 29 nursing homes chosen from 798 pO8sible cases. Excluded
were private not-for-profit homes, government homes, hospital attached homes, and non-
reporting homes. Unless otherwise specLfied, the variables are daily averages, with the unit of
observation being the nursing home. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
We specify a three input translog cost function where the inputs are skilled labor,
unskilled labor, and supplies. The skilled wage is taken to be the average wage of a registered
nurse in the home's market area and the wage of unskilled labor is taken to be the average
wage of an aide in the home's market area. A home's market area is defined later. The price
of supplies is assumed to be the same across homes. Supplies are measured in terms of
expenditures so that its price is one for all homes. We assume that all nursing homes face the
same cost of capital. Capital expenditures are small in nursing homes since the majority of
capital is the building. The size of buildings is roughly proportional to the total number of
patients within the nursing home. In our data, there is little variation in square feet per bed
across homes. Therefore, if the price of capital is not the same across New York State then
our estimation results can be interpreted as a short run cost function, where capital is
proportional to capacity.
The exogenous demand variables are the per capita income of the people living in the
nursing home's market area, the population over age 65 in the nursing home's market area, a
casemix index of health status, an index of market concentration, and the Medicaid
reimbursement rate. The income and population data are from the 1980 census.The
concentration index is a measure which is negatively related to the competitiveness of the
market.
Defining a home's market requires some work. Since homes do not compete for
Medicaid patients, the appropriate market to analyze is the private-pay patient market. The
common assumption is that a home's geographic market is the county in which the home is
located (e.g. Nyman, 1985), but patient origin data indicate that most homes care for a
substantial number of patients whose last residence was not the county in which the home is
located. Instead, separate market areas are defined for each home based on patient origin
data. Homes are assumed to participate in several county markets. A home's participation in'S
a county marketisgiven by the proportion of the home's private-pay patients from that
county. Thus, a home's market area is defined as the counties in which its private-pay
patients last resided, and the proportion of its private-pay patients from each county.
This market definition guides the construction of the demand variables. Each home's
market population is computed as a weighted sum of the number of persons over age 65 in
each county, using the home's proportion of private-pay patients from the counties as weights.
Similarly, the per capita income of the population in a home's market area is computed as the
weighted sum of the county's per capita incomes,
The concentration level of a home's private-pay patient market is computed as a
weighted sum of the county market concentration levels. The notion is that counties comprise
separate markets and nursing homes compete for private-pay patients in several counties. The
competitiveness of a home's market is a weighted average of the competitiveness of the county
markets. The decomposition into county markets is artificial, but is necessary since the data
come aggregated at the county level,
The concentration of each county market is computed using the Herfindahl-
Hirschrnann index, which is the sum of squares of each home's share (proportion) of a county's
private pay patients. Let y, be the number of patients from county j in home i.If s is equal
to the total number of patients in county .j, then the concentration of county market j is:
M = > (y/s)2
The concentration of a home's market is the weighted average of the Mi's. Specifically, the




wheres is the share of home i's patients from county j.
The ca.semix index of health status is based on the Katz Activities of Daily Living
(ADL) index. The ADL index is a measure of a patient's functional level. Katz (1963)
developed the index to explicitly measure function levels among the chroalcally ill and aging
population, and it baa proven a valid and reliable measure. The ADL index is computed from
disability scores assigned to patients in eight functional areas. For each home, patients' ADL- 19
scores are summedand divided by the number of patients in the home. The result is an index
oftheaverageill-health of the patients inafacility.
In1980,New York reimbursednursing homes usinga cost-plusmethod.New York
computeda home's plus' factorbasedon an owner's equity, debt structure, the size of the
facility,andthe valueof assets.Carewastakento ensure that homes could notmanipulate
this formula by constantly resellingthehome so as to increasethevalue of its assets.Also,
thesize ofthe homeand assets were controlled by regulation. Thus, some of the factors in the
plus formula were exogenous to the home.Alternatively, homes could to some extent
manipulate their equity and debt structure so as to maximize their plus factor net of taxes,
but the equity and debt structure decisions are independent of variable input and patient.mix
choices. The plus factor is used as the Medicaid reimbursement rate.• 20 -
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Reduced Form ParametersasFunctions of
Structural Parameters
Moment a. Cost Function
1
log W1 cy(7+ 7qA.) ++ qA + o(7.+ 7qA.)
log Z + Ø,,)c + aqA +
log W,.log W (3 + + b(7+ 7q )+I3i,v(7+ Vq 7q
igW,.log Z 3qAj+ bc + 3yqA(7,,,+ 79.A.)+ ygA)
log Z, .log Z +
b. i-th Share Equation
1 a+70 w,
log WJ 3. + fij.A + •(7+ q.




LogZ 7r. + 7qA
Definitions: b- = + C, =+ (r+ 7qA,).Table 2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
(N =279)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Total Cost (S/day) 5319.74 4287.0
Output (total patients) 121.227 74.230
Cost Shares
Skilled labor 0.206 0.045
Unskilled labor 0.537 0.053
Supplies expenditures 0.257 0.065
Wages
Skilled wage (S/hour) 9.752 3.384
Unskilled wage ($/hour) 7.118 2.451
Demand shifters
Casenix index 0.407 0.154
edicáid plus factor 6.839 2.714
Population 65+ (10000's) 0.964 0.863
Per capita income ($1000s)0.706 0.142
Herfindahi index 0.124 0.118








ALPHAO 2.466 0.726 LAtIBDAW1 -0.014
(12.69) (1.75) 3.87)
ALPHAW1 0.105 0.113 LAMBDM2 -0.022




2.38) ( 1.38) CASEtIIX 0.160
ALPH.AY 0.993 1.769 (LAMBDAZ1) (19.49)
(11.56) (9,66)
ALPHQ 0.221 --- MEDPLUS -0.618
0.22) (LA1IBDAZ1) ( 4.44)
BETAW1W1 0.101 0.143
(13.38) (13.59) POPULATION 0.045
BETAW1W2 -0.064 -0.116 (LAMSDAZI) ( 1.74)
(-7.51) (11.81)
BETA2W2 0,153 0.162 INCOME 0.069
(14.62) (14.23) (LANBDAZ1) ( 1.37)
BETAW1W3 -0.036 -0.027
(11.80) ( 0.41) HERF -2.601
BETAW2W3 -0.090 -0.046 (L:1BDAZ1) (4.97)
(15.87) ( 0.48)
BETAW3W3 0.125 -0.074 POP*INC -0.008






( 2.31) ( 0.03)
BETAY2 -0.012 0.993
4.47) ( 2.73)
BETAY3 0.008 -0.010
3.14) ( 0.14)
BETAQ1 1.0*
SETAQ2 0.384
(4.86)
BETAQ3 -1.384
(18.52)
*Normalizedto1.F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
Q
u
a
U
t
y
_
A
d
u
t
.
d
/
Q
U
Q
U
t
y
E
X
O
g
.
f
l
O
U
3
 
6
5
 
H
i
g
h
 
q
.
a
I
i
L
y
 
6
0
 
5
5
 
a
1
i
t
y
e
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
&
 
—
 
5
0
 
%
1
 
4
-
 
N
 
4
5
 
0
 
U
 
.
 
a
 
4
0
 
0
 
I
-
 
•
 
I
 
2
5
 
o
w
g
o
a
U
t
y
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
U
I
 
I
t
 
I
 
J
U
l
 
2
0
 
5
0
 
1
4
1
 
2
3
2
 
3
2
3
 
4
1
4
 
5
0
5
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
(
P
a
t
I
.
n
t
5
/
U
o
y
)
 